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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
J.A.JIES L ...\TSES and
J ...:\.~IES SDRALES,

Appellants,
Case No. 6237

vs.
~ICK

FLOOR, INC.,

Respondent.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF CASE
On and prior to September 25, 1933, down, to May 31,
1939, the property involved in this suit, 79 West 2nd
South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, was owned: W. P.
Noble Company one half, Ford E. Hovey and Willard li.
Dressler, Trustees, one-fourth and William Frederick
Bragg, Robert Russell Bragg, Frederick Ingham Bragg,
Laura Lillian Harkins and Laura I. Bragg, one-fourth
and, on May 31, 1939, they conveyed it by general warranty deed, with a special warranty of immediate possession to the plaintiffs, who on June 2, 1939, served a notice
on the defendant to deliver up to plaintiffs the possession
of said premises on or before July 1, 1939. The defendant having refused to deliver possession of said premises
to the plaintiffs, they brought this suit in unlawful detainer. (Ab. 1) The defendant answered, alleging that
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on September 25, 1933, it entered into a written agreelnent with the Stockyards National Bank of South
Omaha, a corporation, theW. P. Noble Company, a corporation, and the Fred Bragg Estate, as lessors, executed
by A. H. Ball, Agent, whereby said lessors leased the
premises, 79 West 2nd South Street, to the defendant for
three years at a monthly rental of $75.00 a month; that
said lease agreement provided that if the defendant
should, prior to May 25, 1935, expend $1,000.00 in permanent improvements he could lease said premises for
an additional five years at a monthly rental of $90.00
a month, and that defendant had made such expenditure
and election. Defendant further alleged in its answer
that said lease provides, ''either party agrees to pay all
costs and attorney's fees and expenses incurred by the
other that shall arise from enforcing the covenants of
this lease, ''and alleged that $500.00 was a reasonable
attorneys' fee.
The alleged lease is attached as an exhibit (Ab. 11).
The plaintiffs, in their reply, admitted that Ball had
signed the alleged lease, and denied he had any authority
from the owners, or any of them, and alleged the lease is
void under the provisions of Sections 33-5-1 and 33-5-3,
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, and denied that the defendant had expended $1,000.00 on permanent improvements on said pr~mises or that it had exercised its option
to extend said alleged lease.
The defendant then filed a pleading, alleging the
plaintiffs were estopped from denying Ball's authority
because the rent had been paid as provided in the lease
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and that the O\Yners all kne\Y defendant had expended
$1,000.00 on improve1nents and that plaintiffs and their
predecessors kne\Y of the lease and in1proven1ents and
had ratified the actions of A. H. Ball. (Ab. 18).
To this the plaintiffs, in their second reply, adn1itted the receipt of the rent and denied all other allegations. (Ab. 20).
ASSIGNl\1ENT OF ERRORS
The appellants assign forty-two errors on which they
seek a reversal. They may be summarized as follo,vs :
The court erred in receiving in evidence the alleged
lease, exhibit 28 (Ab. 76); Assignment No. 17 (Ab. 116);
Exhibits 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, (Ab. 26, 30); Assignment No.
17 (Ab. 116), and Exhibits 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39
and 40 (Ab. 90-96); Assignments No. 21 (Ab. 117) and
Exhibits 5, 4, 4-A, 2, 6, 7, 7-A, 8, 9, 10, 1, 3, 10-A, 11,
12, 13, 14 (Ab. 54-56). Assignment No. 10 (Ab. 115);
Exhibits 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 (Ab. 59) ;
Assignment No. 10 (Ab. 115).
The court erred in overruling plaintiffs' objection
to testimony (Ab. 45, 101), Assignments Nos. 1 to 28
(Ab. 114-117), and especially the wide scope of cross
examination of witness, R. Gould-Smith (Ab. 46-61),
Assignments Nos. 1-21 (Ab. 114-116); the direct examination questions to A. H. Ball over plaintiffs' objection
(Ab. 68-80), Assignments 12-17; and overruling of obj.ection to testimony of Nick Floor (Ab. 88-101), Assign~
ments No. 17 to 28 (Ab. 116-118); overruling the objec-
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tion to evidence of H. Arnold Rich (Ab. 98.), Assignment
No. 26 (Ab. 117).
The court erred :
In making each and every one of its findings of fact,
1 to 9 inclusive (Ab. 22-36); Assignments Nos. 29 to 36,
inclusive, (Ab. 118-120).
In making each and every one of its conclusions of
law, 1 to 5, inclusive, (Ab. 37-39); Assignments No. 37-41
inclusive, (Ab. 120).
In rendering judgment in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiffs (Ab. 39); Assignments No. 42 (Ab.
121) and rendering judgment for attorney's fees.
QUESTIONS INVOLVED
The questions involved are :
1. Was the alleged three year lease valid (Ab. 11)
which purported to be executed by the Stockyards National Bank of South Omaha, W. P. Noble Company and
the Fred Bragg Estate, by A. H. Ball, Agent, when it
was stipulated (Ab. 44) the owners, at the time the lease
was .executed, were W. P. Noble Company, a corporation,
one-half interest, Ford E. Hovey and Willard H. Dressler, Trustees, one-fourth interest, William Frederick
Bragg, Robert Russell Bragg, Frederick Ingham Bragg,
Laura Lillian Harkins and Laura I. Bragg one-fourth
interest, and when it was pleaded that the lease was
void under the statute of frauds, sections 33-5-1, and
33-5-3, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933 and it was objected to because one co-tenant could not give a valid lease to
the whole property~
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·) Did the defendant plneP pernlanPnt in1proven1ents of the Ynlue of $1,000.00 on the leased prPnli~·H~.;
prior to ~lay :23, 1935, and eleet to continue said lease
fiYe additional years, ns \Yns provided in said alleged
lease·?
3. If the lease is held to be valid, was the defendant
entitled to recover attorneys' fees against the grantees
of only one of the parties (the W. P. Noble Con1pany),
designated as lessors in said alleged lease, and the plaintiffs' herein~
I.
THE ALLEGED LEASE WAS VOID BECAUSE
A. H. BALL \VAS NOT AUTHORIZED IN
\\:RITING TO EXECUTE A LEASE.
A. H. Ball testified that his father, who died in June,
1930, had collected the rentals on the Eagle Block for
many years and that Walker T. Gunter acted with his
father in handling the affairs of the building and he
signed all leases as witness (Ab. 69). That for several
months during his father's illness, under Mr. Gunter's
orders, he had collected the rentals and made the reports
of rentals collected. (Ab. 70, 71). And he saw Mr.
Gunter as a rule, every day in connection with the estate~.
(Ab. 71). That at the time of his father's death Mr.
Gould-Smith of the Noble Company came to the funeral.
While he was here, "We met with Mr. Gunter at his
office and Mr. Gould-Smith said, 'Just take and handle
the property as my father had' (Ab. 80) I wrote Mr.
Gould-Smith of things to be done in connection with
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building. I consulted with Mr. Gunter all the time, (Ab.
81), and in a conversation with Mr. Gould-Smith at Miss
Noble's home, he said 'Go ahead and collect the rents and
they would decide later what they were going to do.'"
When Mr. Gould-Smith left for home he said, "You go
right on and do things as your father had." (Ab. 86)
''Walker T. Gunter wrote a letter to each, The
Stockyards National Bank of South Omaha, Mr. Brome
an attorney in Wyoming to whom rent due the Bragg~
was transmitted, and Mr. Gould-Smith, advising that I be
continued. I saw the letters he received in reply or he
read them to me. I saw a letter from Mr. Smith. The
letters advised Mr. Gunter that ''I knowing all about the
property, and he advised it would be logical to have me
go and handle the work, the same as my father had.''
(Ab. 72). "I think the letter from Mr. Brome was
written in long hand. I think it was signed C. L. Brome.
I can't say whether the Bragg Estate was mentioned in
the letter. I would say that Dressler's letter was typewritten. I couldn't say that the Stockyards National
Bank of South Omaha was mentioned. Mr. Hovey's name
was not mentioned in this letter." (Ab. 86).
''The letter from Mr. Smith was received by me in
August or September and I gave it to Mr. Gunter. My
wife saw it." (Ab. 82.) Mrs. Ball said she read the letter
which stated, "he was very sorry on the death of Art's
father and asked if Art would continue to carry on the
'vork that his father had previously done. That was all
there was in it. I don't think it mentioned the Eagle
Block." (Ab. 84) Mr. Ball testified that the letters had
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been burned or destroyed by Mr. Gunter's folks after his
death.
Then ~lr. Ball produced exhibits 25, 26 and 27, which
purported to be leases on parts of the Eagle Block, lea.~
ing store roo1ns for three years, which had been signed
by H. T. Ball and witnessed by Walker T. Gunter, and,
over plaintiffs' objection, the court received in evidence
these leases, (Ab. 74; Assignment No. 17, Ab. 116).
Mr. Dressler said, ''I don't think I wrote a letter to
A. H. Ball, after his father's death, that I desired or requested said A. H. Ball to collect the rents and look after
the property as his father had done". (Ab. 62).
1Ir. Gould-Smith testified he was secretary and
treasurer of the W. P. Noble Company, and resides in
San Francisco. That Mr. H. T. Ball had collected the
rentals of the Eagle Block since 1909. ''Shortly after his
death, in June, 1930, Mr. Gunter a.nd I verbally employed
his son, A. H. Ball as agent. Mr. Gunter died September
23, 1933. Until his death, he and I were consulted on all
matters of importance, and after his death Mr. Ball consulted with me by mail frequently. Mr. Ball was allowed
$60.00 a month. He reported his collections monthly and
reported the collections by the street number, not by
the name of the tenant. He never mentioned he gave a
lease." (Ab. 51).
While the direct examination of Mr. Gould-Smith
had been limited, the court, over plaintiffs' objection,
threw wide open the cross examination. (Ab. 45-62;
Assignments Nos. 1 to 13, Ab. 114, 115), and permitted

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
the questions to go far afield from the subject of the
direct exan1ina tion.
There is not a scintilla of evidence that the Senior
Ball ever had written authority to make leases. The
testimony was that he and Mr. Gunter made a few leases
for a period exceeding a year. Under the authorities,
this was not any proof of written authorization to A. H.
Ball to execute this lease. The case of Darke v. Smith,
14 Utah 35, 45 P. 1006 is decisive. We quote from p. 1009:
"The defendant testified that in April, 1884,
he received a letter from his father, who was then
in Arizona, and afterwards lost it in moving. Jane
L. Smith testified that she read the letter; that it
was Lot Smith's \vriting; that her son let her
read it; that intestate stated in it that he wanted
the defendant to take possession of the land, and
make him a home, and he would give him a deed to
it; that the letter mentioned the land. It referred
to the land he owned in Weber. He owned other
land there. T'vo other witnesses corroborate the
defendant and Jane L. Smith in some material
respects. While the letter, as remembered by the
\vitnesses, does not contain a description of the
land in dispute, or refer to it with reasonable certainty, the testimony of the witnesses, taken in
connection with the letter, indicates that the land
in dispute was intended. We think this letter was
not sufficiently definite and certain as a writing
to take the transaction out of the statute of
frauds.''
In Abba v. Smyth, a Utah case, 59 P. 756, 21 Utah
109, the first paragraph of the syllabus is as follows:
"Under section 2647, Rev. St., unless the es-
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sential tern1s of the contraet can be deter1nined
fron1 the contrnet itself, it is 'Yithin thP statute of
frauds; and, if thus defeetive, the defect cannot
be supplied by parol proof, for by adn1itting
parol testin1ony to supply the essential parts of
the contract, "'ould be to restore the 1nischief
"~hich the enactment of the statute of frauds vvas
framed to prevent.''

In Adan1s v. ~Ianning, 46 Utah 82, 148 P. 465, the
fourth paragraph of the syllabus is as follows:
'' vVhere a contract for the sale of 30 acres of
land did not designate the property, and the
grantor owned considerable land, mere possession
of a particular parcel by letting stock graze thereon will not take the case out of the statute of
frauds by identifying the land. ' '
"A written memorandum stating that it is
agreed by the parties that each of them can sell
certain lots, 'and each party has the privilege to
sell each lot at $250.00, which shall pay Mr. Ringer
in full for said lots, and if sale is not made within
16 days Mr. H. is to pay to Mr. Ringer the original price agreed upon' betwen them is insufficient, within the statute of frauds, when the agreement as to the original price is oral." Syllabus
Ringer v. Holtzclaw, 20 S. W. 800
''Where, in an assignment of a lease, there is
no agreement by the assignor to put the assignee
in possession of the leased property, oral evidence
is not permissible to show that prior to the execution of the assignment the assignor made such
agreement. Parol evidence is not permissible to
supply defects in a written contract, which, by the
statute of frauds, is required to be in writing."
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Syllabus, Boyd v. Paul, 28 S. W. 171.
''The written authorization from the owner,
in order that it may be sufficient to permit the
owner to enter into a binding contract of lease,
must express within its terms the intention of the
owner to confer upon the agent complete authority to do so. The mere employment by the owner
of an agent to lease his real property will usually
be held insufficient as a grant of power to execute
a binding lease. ''
27 C. J. 298, last par. sec. 376
An agent received from an owner of a lot
a letter asking the agent ''to see what he could do
about selling the lot'', etc., but it did not authorize
the agent to sell the lot. Agent made written contract to sell the lot to Lennox and recorded the
contract. A day or two later the owner of the lot
sold it to Johnson who entered upon the property
and made valuable improvemens. Lennox sued
Johnson, et al to compel specific performance. He
lost his case.
Court held the letter gave the agent no power
or authority to sell the lot and further held that
one dealing with an agent was bound at his peril
to learn the extent of the agent's authority.
Johnson v. Lennox, 133 P. 744 (Colo.)
In the case of Salter v. I ves, et al, (Cal.) 155 P. 84,
the owner of the property wrote to an agent authorizing
him to negotiate a lease and setting forth the terms of the
lease, and it was held that the mere employment by the
owner of an agent to sell or lease the property is usually
insufficient as a grant of power to execute a binding conveyance or lease, and it was further held that a binding
lease must be executed by the owners.
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. .\n agent, "'"ith oral authority to sell land, wrote to
his principal that he had sold a part of it and the principal made a deed for the land sold and \YTote the agent,
''I a1n glad you have sold 80 acres; no\v sell the 40. '' It
\Yas held that this ''is "'"holly insufficient to constitute
such a written memorandum of the contract of sale as
"Tould have bound Feger"* * * *"It was wholly insufficient to identify the 40 acres intended to be sold. And
although both the principal and the agent n1ay have
understood that it was the 40 acres of the principal's
farm that lay south of the road, that fact lies wholly outside of the written authority, and cannot be added to it
by parol.''
Johnson v. Fecht, 83 S. W. 1077 (p.
1079)
"A letter to an agent, saying, 'As you stated
you could get $30,000 for the place you occupy
* * * * and if you can, we will sell at that price
• • • * and allow you two and one-half per cent on
said price-merely authorizes the .agent to find a
purchaser, but not to sell; and a contract by the
agent to sell confers no rights on the purchaser.''
Syllabus, Grant v. Ede, 24 P. 890
On certain property a company was given ''the full
management and. control thereof, with power to collect
the rents and income therefrom, to pay the taxes, insurance premiums and other fixed charges incident thereto
and to make all necessary repairs and to do all other
things which second party (the Guardian Savings &
Trust Co.) deems necessary or advisable in the proper
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management of said property.'' The court held this was
insufficient, saying:
"It is significant, too, that nowhere in the
enumeration of the powers delegated to the agent
is any express power conferred to execute any
lease whatever'' * * * *
Lithograph Bldg. Co. v. Watt, 117
N. E., p. 28
The owner of land wrote his attorney, saying he
would take $200.00 £or certain timber land, if removed
in a year, and "if this is satisfactory to the buyers you
may close the deal.'' Held, this is not sufficient authority
for the agent to make a contract of sale. The court said:
"We are of the opinion that the authority of
a real estate agent or broker to bind the principal
by a contract of sale should clearly and unequivocally appear before the latter can be held."
LaPlant v. Loveland, 170 N. W. 920
''The contract must be complete in itself and
leave nothing to rest in parol. And it must be certain and definite as to the parties, property, consideration, premises and time of performance.''
Cooper v. Pierson, 180 N. W. 351
Other authorities holding that the mere employment
of an agent to rent real property does not authorize the
agent to enter into a long-term lease, are:
Miller v. Shaw, 195 P. 743
Campbell v. Galloway, 47 N. E. 620
Perky v. Harding, 123 N. W. 69
Farley v. Fair, 256 P. 1031
It is apparent that Ball's authority, being in parol,
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he could not grant a lease for n1ore ,than one year without
the 'Yritten approval of his principals. Gunter's approval
had ahYays been secured by Ball's father, and by Ball,
prior to this lease.
To summarize briefly, the evidence as to the contents of the alleged letters shows conclusively that they
were insufficient as a writing because, (a) they did not
identify the property. Ball testified they said "for him
to carry on as his father did.'' He did not testify that
they named the property. Mrs. Ball testified that she
could not recall whether ''Eagle Block'' was mentioned
in the alleged Smith letter. Therefore, the description
of the property would have to be supplied by oral testimony, which under the authorities cited, is not admissable; (b) To "carry on as his father did," there is no
evidence that the father had any written authority and
it is a novel proposition to say that while the agent acting did not have written authority he may act because he
is authorized to act as his predecessor did, even though
the predecessor had no written authority. Under the
defendant's contention, Ball could have made a lease for
99 years as well as f.or 8 years. There is no limitation to
this authority which it is alleged jumps from father to
son and gains force with each jump. So we have here
the whole question of authority to be supplied by oral
evidence and nothing intimating that the father had
written authority. Therefore, it follows conclusively that
if Ball ''may act as his father did,'' there is no evidence
that the father had written authority; therefore, there is
not sufficient writing to comply with the statute, and
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even if no written authorization were required they have
failed, because the father acted with Walker T. Gunter,
and Gunter was not consulted here.
(c) The evidence does not show that the alleged
letters were signed by the owners of the property, or any
of them. Ball testified that Gunter received a letter from
Dressler, but did not say Dressler signed it. He did
testify that neither Hovey nor the Stockyards National
Bank of South Omaha was mentioned. Both Mr. and Mrs.
Ball testified a letter was received from Mr. Smith.
They did not say it was signed W. P. Noble Company, by
Mr. Smith or by Mr. Smith personally. The signatures
of the parties are essential. None of the Braggs signed
anything, and it was not shown that Brome, the lawyer
to whom collections were remitted, had any authority to
lease the property, nor were the signatures of any other
person shown to have been subs-cribed to the mythical
letters.
Clearly the Court erred in overruling the plaintiffs'
objections to the introduction of the lease (Exhibit 28)
because there was no written authority and the parties
nan1ed as lessors in the lease were not the owners (Ab.
76; Assignment No. 17, Ab. 116). Clearly the court erred
in o·verruling plaintiffs' objections to the oral evidence
endeavoring to show authority in A. H. Ball (Ab. 67-80,
Assignment Nos. 14 to 19, Ab. 116), and the testimony
as to the contents of the letters (Ab. 67-80, Assignment
Nos. 14 to 19, A b. 116).
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II.
THE .A.LLEGED LEASE \\TAS VOID, BECAUSE IT
\V-AS NOT EXECUTED BY OR ON BEHALF
OF ALL THE 0\\TNERS.
It "'"as stipulated (Ab. 44) that the owners of the
property, at and prior to the time of the alleged lease,
'vere the vV. P. Noble Company, a corporation, owning a
one-half interest; \\Tillard H. Dressler and Ford E.
Hovey, Trustees, owning a one-fourth interest; William
Frederick Bragg, Robert Russell Bragg, Frederick Ingham Bragg, Laura Lillian Harkins and Laura I. Bragg,
owning an undivided one-fourth interest. The lessors of
the alleged lease were the Stockyards National Bank of
South Omaha, the W. P. Noble Company, both corporations, and the Fred Bragg estate, and these names were
signed to the lease as lessors by A. H. Ball, Agent (Ab.
11).
No one co-tenant has the power to make a lease to
the entire property without the other co-tenants. Such
a lease would be an attempted eviction by one co-tenant
of his co-tenants. This principle was well illustrated
in the case of Howard v. Manning, 192 P. 358, and we
quote paragraphs 10 and 12, beginning on page 361, as
follows:
"Neither of the tenants in common is entitled
to the exclusive possession of all the land to the
exclusion of his co-tenants, nor entitled to possession to any particular part of it. As he cannot exclude his co-tenants by his own occuption of the
land, he cannot, without their consent or ratifica-
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tion, lease all or any particular part of the land
in such a way that his lessee will have the right
to the exclusive possession of all the land or any
part thereof. It is well settled that a lessee of one
tenant in common by a lease in which the other
tenants have not joined is, as to them, a trespasser so far as he occupies any portion of the
land. The lessee of one tenant in common is a
trespasser as to the other tenants in common, but
the lease is not void as aginst the tenant in common executing it. Underhill on Landlord and Tenant, vol. 1, sees 62 and 64; Miles v. Fink, 119 Miss.
147, 80 South. 532; South Penn Oil Co. v. Haught,
71 W. V a. 720, 78 S. E. 759; Watford Oil & Gas
Co. v. Shipman, 233 Ill. 9, 84 N. E. 53, 122 Am.
St. Rep. 144; Ziegler v. Brennerman, 237 Ill. 15,
86 N. E. 597; Archer on Oil and Gas, p. 660;
Stewart v. Tennant, 52 W. Va. 559, 44 S. E. 223.
Neither tenant in common has, by virtue of his
relationship to his co-tenant in common, any authority to act as agent for his companion in either
giving a lease or enforcing a forfeiture thereof.
Freeman on Co-tenancy, and Partition, sec. 180;
38 Cyc. p. 105; Rotzlen v. Merchants Loan &
Trust Co. (S.D.) 170 N. W. 128; Adams v. Yukon
Gold Co., 251 Fed. 226, 163 C. C. A. 382.
The rule is stated possibly a little differently in the
case of Satterlee v. Umenthum, 198, N. W. 823, and we
quote from paragraph 1 of the opinion on page 823, as
follows:
''We are of the opinion that respondent, by
virtue of the lease did, for the period of its duration, become a tenant in common with appellant's
wards. In Tiffany on Real Property (2nd Ed.),
p. 683, vve find the rule thus stated:
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co-tenant rannot 1uake a lease valid as
against other eo-tenants, so as to give to the le~spe
the right of PxclusiYe possession of any part of
the land, unless he "·as authorized to act as their
agent in 1naking the lease, or unless, having n1ade
it as their agent, his act is ratified by then1. The
effect of a lease by one cotenant, acting for himself alone, is at most merely to confer on the
lessee a right to share in the possession for the
tern1 of the lease, that is, to make the lessee a cotenant for the term.' "
Our own Supreme Court in the case of Shell Oil
Company v. Stiffler, 87 Utah 176, 48 P. (2d), 503, recognizes this rule. In this case a husband and wife, as co-tenants, executed a lease. Later the lessee and the husband
made a modification of the lease without authorization
from the wife, and the court held that the modification
was void.
There is also another serious defect as regards the
lease, in this : Dressler and Hovey were trustees of a onefourth interest. It should be proven, and we believe it
was not, that Dressler wrote a letter to Gunter stating
that A. H. Ball "could carry on as his father had done,"
and if it should be asumed that this letter contained
sufficient writing to comply with the statute of frauds,
then the lease in question would be defective because,
where there are trustees, all of the trustees must be
parties to any agreement or authorization to an agent.
The United States Supreme Court case of Winslo-vv
v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, 188 U. S. 646, 47
L. Ed. 635 was a case in which the trustees had given a
lease, and thereafter one of the trustees executed an

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18

agreement for an extension of the lease, and Mr. Justice
Packham, speaking for the Court, said:
''In fact, however, the lease was not legally
rene"\ved in 1892, because the paper of that year
was signed by one trustee only. In our opinion
his signature did not make a valid lease. It required the signatures of all the trustees.''
"It is contended that the act of one of the
trustees in signing the lease was subsequently
ratified by the other by a recognition of its existence by long continued silence, if not by an express ratification. But an express ratification
would consist of the signature of the other trustee
to the paper, and of that there is no pretense. A
ratification of an invalid instru1nent of this nature
by recognition, we do not understand. The instrument was void under the statute of frauds, because of the lack of those signatures which could
alone render it valid as a lease for five years.
Recognition could not take the place of the absent
signature. Whether the conduct of the trustees,
or of Mrs. Patterson, amounted to such a part
performance of an invalid contract as would take
the place of the otherwise necessary signatures
is another question. It is difficult to see how there
could be any technical ratification of this instrument ""rithout a signing thereof by the other
trustee.
But, assuming that something in the nature
of a ratification might be based upon the subsequent recognition, yet such recognition or ratification must be shown to have been founded upon
a full knowledge of all the facts. There is no evidence of that kind in the case; none that the other
trustee even knew of the existence either of the
written paper of 1892 or that it contained a cove-
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nant to rene\Y at all for any tilne. The possession by the ron1pany and the paytnPnt of rent
\Yere provided for by the covenant to renew contained in the lease of 1888, and hence there was a
justification for that possession and for the paynlent of the n1oney, \Yhich 'vas entirely con1patible
'vith the non-existence of any written lease from
1892, or of any covenant to again renew for five
years from August 1, 1897. This possession and
payment cannot, therefore, be used as a basis for
the presumption of knowledge on the part of the
trustee of the existence of the so-called lease of
1892 or of the covenant contained therein.''
Our own Supreme Court, in the case of Utah Loan
and Trust Company v. Garbutt, 6 Utah 142; 23 P. 758,
makes the same holding with reference to the necessity
of all the trustees joining in giving the written authorization to an agent.
James on ''Option Contracts,'' sec. 811, lays down
the following rule:
''The mere fact that the optioners are the
owners of the optioned property as tenants in
common, or as joint tenants, does not, as we have
seen, clothe any of the tenants with power or
authority to give an option upon the common
property that will be binding upon any interest
except his own. The relation of principal and
agent does not exist between tenants so far at
least as the right to dispose of the common property is concerned. Nor are they partners. With
reference to the subject matter under consideration, the relation between them is not different
from that existing between owners ·of separate
and distinct parcels of land, with the consequence
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that the power of one to sell or dispose of the interest of the other as well as to accept or receive
notice of election, must rest upon authority either
impliedly or expressly granted.''
In the case of Landt v. Schneider, 77 P. 307, (Mont.)
there were three lessors and the lessee claimed there had
been a modification of the lease by one of the lessors
acting for all, and to substantiate the defense they offered a letter written to one of the lessors by another lessor
in behalf of himself and the other lessors, "We (Ritter
and Buxman) have concluded that Mr. Ritter goes to
your place and all what he agrees about the brewery in
Maiden is all right with me.''
We quote further from the s.ame case :
''This letter is signed by Geo. Buxman. Plaintiffs sought to show by this letter that Ritter had
authority to enter into the agreement of September 20th extending the lease as the agent of
Buxn1an. The court refused to admit the letter.
This letter is a statement by plaintiff Landt, and
does not purport to grant written authority to
Ritter to contract for and on behalf of Buxman.
Subdivision 5, sec. 2185, Civ. Code, provides that
an agreement for leasing for a longer period than
one year, or for the sale of real property, or for
an interest therein, must be in writing, and such
agreement, if made by an agent, is invalid, unless
the authority of the agent be in writing, subscribed by the principal sought to be charged. Section
1504, Civ. Code, provides that, \vhen an attorney
in fact executes an instrument transferring an interest in real property, he must subscribe the
name of his principal to it, and his own name as
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attorney in faet. Ritter had no \Yritten authority,
as appears fron1 this record, to contract for Buxnlan: nor is Buxn1an 's narne signed to thP agreenlent extending the tin1e of this lease. This lease
and agreement of extension also en1body an agreeInent for the sale and conveyance of this land to
defendant. Under the facts here presented, this
alleged agreement of Buxman 's amounts to nothinb more than a parol agreement to extend the
tern1s of the "\vritten lease and agreement to convey for more than one year beyond the date "\Vhen
the contract of extension was entered into.''
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT ACT IN GOOD
FAITH, AS HE HAD NOT ONLY CONSTRUCTIVE BUT ACTUAL NOTICE THAT BALL
WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO EXECUTE
SUCH A LEASE.
Nick Floor testified that at the time he secured the
lease he consulted with and submitted it to an attorney,
Mr. Knowlton. (Ab. 106, 107). He did not say what the
attorney advised him, nor did he produce the attorney
as a witness to testify that he had advised him that
the lease was in due form and would be a binding obligation. We must b.elieve that he was told of the infirmities
in the lease. A. H. Ball purported to sign as the agent
of a bank in another state, the agent of a Utah corporation, and the agent of an estate. This was an 8-year
lease. Any lawyer would have asked, ''Has Ball written
authorization from the bank; have the duly authorized
officials of the Utah Corporation excuted a power of
attorney appointing Ball agent, with power to lease the
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property~"

And then we have the "Fred Bragg estate."
Is there an order of court authorizing Mr. Ball to lease
the property of the Estate~ Eight years is a long time
to tie up the property of an estate. No lawyer could have
failed to warn Mr. Floor of these facts and advised him
of the necessity of securing proof of Mr. Ball's authority.
The law cast on Mr. Floor the duty to ascertain
these facts. Any lawyer would know Mr. Ball's authority
must be in writing. The lawyer must have advised Mr.
Floor accordingly. The duty was cast on Floor to ascertain the authority of Ball and he cannot evade that
duty by saying he did not know. The authorities all hold
that the duty is cast upon the lessee to determine the authorization of the person who purports to act for the
principals.
2 C. J ., p. 565, sec. 207, lays down the rule thusly:
''\Vhere a third person dealing with an agent
has knowledge that his authority must necessarily
be in writing in order to bind the principal, it is
his duty to ascertain whether the agent has such
authority and whether it is in proper form; and
where there is written authority, whether it is required or not, and such person has, or is charged
with, knowlQdge thereof, it is his duty to ascertain
the nature and extent of the authority conferred,
and whether the agent is acting within its scope,
unless he is excused from inspecting the written
authority by a statement from the principal himself defining the authority. When the authority is
by law required to be in writing he is charged
with knowledge of the fact, and of the limitations
upon the agent's power contained in such writing.''
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This rule is confirmed in 2 C. J. S., p. 1191, (Note
74) as follo'NS:
So it is in any situation "\Yh( l'e the agent's
power is by la'v required to be contained or expressed in "\vriting; in such a situation, a third
person is affected by notice of the existence and
the contents of the power, alike whether he does
or does not knovv of such n1a tters. ''
H

THERE

' 7"AS

1

NON-EVIDENCE OF ESTOPPEL
OR RATIFICATION

The defendant alleged that it had paid the rent
according to the terms of the said lease and that the
plaintiffs' predecessors had received the rent, which
plaintiffs admitted. The defendant further alleged that
the original lessors had notice of the lease and of the fact
that defendant, in reliance thereon, had spent $1,000.00
in permanent improvements. This is. denied. A. H. Ball
carefully concealed from the owners the fact of the
Floor lease. On October 20, 1933, Mr. Ball wrote Mr.
Gould-Smith: "I have delayed sending the report for
September on the Eagle Building, hoping I would have
something definite to say with respect to 79 West 2nd
South * * * * We have a good man in 79, and I feel that
things will be all right on the corner now." (Ab. 52).
The monthly reports of collections merely reported the
monthly payments of "79 West 2nd South." When
Gould-Smith and Dressler visited Salt Lake City, Mr.
Ball told them nothing of the lease. The letters and
Inonthly reports submitted by Mr. Ball never mentioned
the giving of leases. (Exhibits 4 to 23 ; A b. 54-60).
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11r. Dressler testified he visited Salt Lake City in
November, 1937, and went to the Eagle Block with Mr.
Ball, but did not go inside, and was told nothing as to
tenants. (Ab. 63-65).
Mr. Gould-Smith testified he came to Salt Lake City
tv,To or three times a year. "Occasionally I would go
do·vv-n with !!r. Ball and look at the Eagle Block." Ball
'vould say, "I have got a tenant for such and such a
place.'' We discussed repairs. I noticed no change in
1934 and 1935, only that it looked older. (Ab. 45-48).
Mr. Ball testified that Mr. Gould-Smith· was here
several times. ''We would walk over to the Eagle Building, and he would look at it from the outside, and he
said 'Carry on as you are.' I pointed out to Mr. GouldSmith that the tenant, at his own expense, had put in
'just a little strip of tile'' on West Temple Street, under
the window. I told Mr. Smith I thought we had a ¥ery
good man in there and I was sure we would get the
rent," to which Mr. Smith said, "Fine."
''None of the Bragg heirs came. Mr. Dressler came
in the Fall of '36 or the Spring of '37. I showed him the
property and he said it needed a lot of improvements,
and I said, 'Yes.' Nothing was said about any leases or
who was occupying it. I don't think anything was said to
Mr. Smith about leases." (Ab. 78)
There is no basis for estoppel or ratification. There
can be neither without a full knowledge of all of the
facts. A. H. Ball showed in his testimony, respecting the
visits of these principals, that his treachery to his principals in making the Floor lease and not reporting it, was
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continuing. He led ~lr. Gould-Smith to believe that the
tenant, at his o'Yn expense, had put in "A little strip of
tile.'' This sho"\vs clearly that Ball's failure to disclose
to his principals the fact of the Floor lease was not mere
oversight, but deliberate betrayal of the interest of his;
principals. It 'vas the duty of Ball to tell them the facts.
The principals, having full confidence, in Ball, made no
inquiry and the principals were lulled into security that
their agent was not unfaithful to his duties. Query:
1
\ \ as Ball acting to protect Floor by concealing the lease~
So long as the principals did not kno'v of the lease Floor
was secure, but if he had disclosed the fact he knew his
services would be terminated and Floor's lease terminated. He knew that Gould-Smith had told him, in April,
1933, he wanted to keep the building free and intact; that
there might be a chance to sell it (Ab. 61, 62 and 110).
He testified, ''I knew in 1937 that some of the owners
wanted to sell. I received the original of Exhibit F in
May, 1936. I knew some of the owners wanted to sell. I
didn't call the attention of anyone that I had given a
lease which would not expire until 1941." (Ab. 87).
Willard H. Dressler testified the first he knew of
the Floor lease was when he received a notice from the
plaintiffs, dated June 9, 1939, that Floor claimed a lease
(Ab. 64) and that he immediately wrote Ball. Ball testified that Dressler wrote a letter exhibiting surprise. ''I
got the impression from the letter that Mr. Dressler
knew nothing about the lease, that he considered this
thing a racket.'' ''I didn't tell Mr. Dressler there was a
lease. I don't know why I didn't tell him in my letter
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of July 15, 1939, that I had previously told him about the
lease in '36 or '37. ''
The disloyalty of Ball continued to the last. Knowing his principals were selling the property he gave no
notice to them of the lease and permitted them to give
a general warranty deed with a special warranty, warranting immediate possession. He did his utmost to protect Floor, to the detriment of his principals, to the last.
The case of Jones v. Mutual Creamery qompany,
17 P. (2d), 256, 81 Utah, 223, is conclusive. The judgment was unanimous. We quote from the opinion written
by Justice Straup, as follows:
"It is well recognized that, in order that a
ratification of an unauthorized act or transaction
of an agent or of another may be valid and binding, it is essential that the principal or the person
making the ratification had full knowledge at the
time of the ratification of all rna terial facts and
circumstances relative to the unauthorized act or
transaction (2 C. J. 476), and also that an intention to ratify is essential and which must be
shown either by an express or by an implied ratification (2 C. J. 484, 492.).
The foregoing decision is in harmony with the practically universal authority as shown by a portion of
sections 205 and 206, 21, C. J ., beginning on page 1202,
as follows:
''Where a person has, with knowledge of the
facts, acted or conducted himself in a particular
manner, or asserted a particular claim, title or
right, he cannot afterwards assume a position inconsistent with such act, claim or conduct to the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27

prejudice of another \Yho has acted in reliance on
sneh con duet or represpntation. ''
• ~To render the rule operative it is essential
that in taking the forn1er position the party
against ''rhom the estoppel is claimed should have
acted \Yith kno\vledge of his rights, and that he
\vas a\Yare of the facts in respect of the estoppel
claimed; also that the party invoking the estoppel
\vas misled by the acts or conduct of the party
against "~hom the estoppel is claimed; that he
changed his position in reliance thereon, and was
justified in so doing, and that he was prejudiced
thereby, or the party against whom the estoppel
is claimed benefitted.''

v.
THERE WAS NO EXTENSION BECAUSE, (a)
NOTICE TO BALL WAS NOT NOTICE TO THE
PRINCIPALS; (b) DEFENDANT DID NOT
EXPEND $1,000.00 IN PERMANENT IMPROVEMENTS; (c) DEFENDANT
DID NOT, IN WRITING, AGREE
TO THE EXTENSION.
(a) We have this situation: Ball executed this
lease without authority, it being a lease which the statute
provides must be authorized in writing, and an agent
not having written authority has no authority. Further,
the duty is cast up·on the defendant to ascertain whether
or not the agent had written authority.
Restatement of Agency, 279;
2. C. J. S., p. 1081, sec. 42
Under these circumstances, the owners were not affected by the knowledge of the agent; in fact, it was, in
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a way, a conspiracy between the agent and the defendant,
both knowing that the agent had no "\\Tritten authority.
The agent carefully concealed from his principals the
fact that a written lease had been made. His letter or
report to Mr. Smith after the execution of the Floor
lease, was ''We have a good man in 79. '' (Ab. 52.) This
also was erroneous, because the tenant was a corporation.
The relationship of principal and agent is fiduciary in character. The agent owes the highest duty to
his principal and eoncealing from his principal important
facts is as disloyal as giving erroneous information. The
principals had correspondence with Ball respecting the
sale of the property and Ball was contacting real estate
agents respecting the matter. Ball knew that the principals were selling the property, yet he never warned
them that there was an outstanding lease, and the principals executed warranty deeds containing a rather unusual clause warranting immediate possession. Ball has
been disloyal to his principals ever since September 25,
1933; he was acting with the lessee, both had full knowledge that Ball had no authority.
The presumption that an agent will notify his principal ·of matters pertaining to the business with which he
is entrusted is not applicable to those acts which were
executed by the agent in disloyalty to his principal. In··
other words, it cannot be presumed that the agent will
notify his principal of his own breach of duty and disloyaly. The case of Dixie Guano Co. v. Wessel, 296
Fed. 433, was a case in which the plaintiff's agent had
been disloyal and sold goods belonging to it for his own
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account, and after n1ore than a yPar had elapsed the
plaintiff sued the party receiving the goods, who plead
an estoppel and ratification, and the court held that
there \vas no possible basis for estoppel and quoted the
case of An1erican Surety Con1pany v. Pauly, 170 U. S.
133, 150, and 42 L. Ed. 977, as follows :
'"Ordinarily a corporation, like any other
principal, is chargeable \vith the knovvledge of any
facts \Yhich are knovvn to its agents; but in this
case all these transactions, if there were any
transactions of a fraudulent and dishonest character, on the part of the cashier, vvere transactions for the benefit of Collins, and he was a
participator in the fraud, and under those circumstances the law does not infer that the agent or
the officer will communicate the fact to his principal, the corporation, and under such circumstances the corporation is not bound by his knowledge. So this defense melts away and there is
nothing of it whatever."
This case contains quotations of a similar effect
from many other cases and citations to many authorities.
In the case of Lithograph Building Co. v. Watt, 117
N. E. 25, which vve have quoted above, respecting a written authorization which was insufficient on its face to
authorize the lease, the court held:
''Here the purchaser was bound to know the
extent of the agent's authority. The contract
made by the agent exceeded that authority, and
the principal repudiated it as soon as he learned
that it had been made. The case contains none
of the elements which must be present before the
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application of the doctrine of estoppel can be insisted upon.''
2. C. J. S., p. 1081, sec. 42, states,
''Where material facts are suppressed or unknown there is no valid ratification.''
and on page 1083, of the same section we quote :
''As a corollary to the rule that the principal
must have knowledge of the material facts relating to the authorized act of his agent in order to
ratify the same, it follows that, notwithstanding
a principal's approval of unauthorized acts which
have been done on his behalf by another, if the
material facts be either suppressed or unknown
there is no valid ratification. In this respect it is
immaterial whether the principal's "\vant of knowledge is due to designed or undesigned concealment or willful misrepresentation on the part of
the agent or his mere inadvertence, or whether
the question of ratification arises between the
principal and the agent or arises with respect to
third persons. ''
If Floor had been innocent here, that is, if he hadn't
been under the duty of ascertaining that Ball had written
authority, he could have sued Ball for damages.
2 C. J.· S., page 114, sec. 208
2 C. J. S., page 117, sec. 211
But under the circumstances, he was negligent respecting
a matter which it was his duty to ascertain the fact, that
is, whether Ball had written authority to execute this
lease. Another strange feature: Ball says he hired
(after Gunter's death) Mr. Cluff as attorney for his
principals (Ab. 81). Now Ball, at every stage, rendered
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such help as he could to the defendant, and the attorney
he claims to haYe hired for his principals is in the employ
of the defendant in this action. Under these circumstances, in so far as Floor "\Yas concerned, Ball did not
represent the original O"\vners, because he carefully concealed from them all the facts. Therefore, he had no
right or authority to make any approval of the improvements that Floor placed in the property, nor did he have
any right or authority to accept notice of the renewal of
the lease.
2 C. J. S., p. 1078, section 39, states:
"It is essential to ratification that the right
to repudiate exist.
In addition to the other essential elements of
ratification hereafter considered in sections 40-44,
it is held to be necessary that the third person
who deals with the agent be ignorant of the fact
that the agent lacks authority to act and that the
principal be permitted to repudiate the act if he
chooses so to do.''
And the following from the case of Allen v. Greenland Oil Company, 256 P., 1004:
"The doctrine of ratification of an agent's
unauthorized agreements implies the existence
of at least two essential elements: (a) that the
party contracting with the agent did not know the
agent lacked authority to make the agreement,
and (b) that the principal had the privilege of repudiating the unauthorized agreement, if he did
not choose to ratify it."
This shows conclusively that our contention that the
disloyalty of Ball in concealing all the facts of this al-
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leged lease removed him as the agent of the owners
respecting his dealings with the defendant, all of which
were based upon concealment. Otherwise, how can the
basis of ratification, as shown in section (a) of the Allen
v. Greenland Oil Company case depend upon the defendant knowing that the agent lacked the authority, because
here he is presumed to have known and it is the same as
if he knew and, therefore, it was a deal between Ball and
the defendant so long as the facts were kept from the
owners. True, they received the rent from Floor, and
Floor received a big value .for every dollar he paid for
rent.
Other authorities holding that the rule imputing
agent's knowledge to the principals does not apply when
the third party knew that the agent in the original contract did not have authority to make the contract are:
Jenkins-Renfro 66 S. E. 212, 25 L.
R. A., N. S., 231
]deacharn, Agency, sec. 721
3 C. J. S., p. 218, sec. 280
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hilton, 241
U. S. 613, 60 L. Ed. 202
]dillincarnp v. Willenberg, 169 N. \V.
100
]dcCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 Fed.
163
Scripture v. Scottish American, 49
s. w. 644
(b) The defendant has pleaded that he expended
$1,000.00 in permanent improvements and the lease provided that in order to be entitled to a renewal it was
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necessary for him to haYe expended $1,000.00 in permanent iinprovements on or before lVIay 1, 1935.
Permanent improvements necessarily means those
improvements "~hich pern1anently affect the building,
and not merely such in1provements as are convenient for
the use of a particular tenant or which will be used up or
worn out during the period of the tenancy. The defendant has made proof of large expenditures but he has
failed to segregate trade improvements, or improvements
"\Yhich will be worn out during his tenancy, from the
permanent improvements. The court overruled plaintiffs' objections on these grounds. (Ab. 91, Assignment
of Error 21, Ab. 117). The clear duty rests upon the
defendant to make this segregation. The defendant introduced the following bills :
The Granite Mill and Fixture Co. (Exhibit 32, Ab.
91), for a large number of items for a total of $820.00,
including a new floor, which we admit was necessary, but
when defendant decided to conduct a dance hall, it required a maple floor, 12 x 22 feet, which had to be
smoothed and sanded twice. When the license for dancing was not renewed, defendant put linoleum over the
maple floor. At first fir flooring was ordered and then
changed to maple: it added the exchange cost $15.00
(Ab. 102, 104).
The toilet was on the main floor. ''I thought for my
business I would rather have it downstairs.''
Then there were two stairways, one in the southeast
corner, which was enlarged, and leads to a ladies' rest
room which defendant installed, and an opening in the
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floor was cut in the west side and a stairway constructed
to the men's toilet. The framework for these toilets
could be removed. The opening and the stairway on the
east side was not used.
We submit that moving the toilet downstairs and
making a place for a new stairway instead of using the
old one are alterations to suit the tenant's desire, and not
permanent improvements. The linoleum on the floor and
the carpet on the stairway, which was charged in the bill,
were worn out and had been removed. (Ab. 102, 103).
The trap placed under the bar to catch the water from
the bar and the 50 to 60 feet of 2-inch pipe leading t~J
the sewer was included. A paneling was placed around
the room and the same paneling was placed in an old
closet owned by Floor at the north end of the bar, and
included in the cost. When defendant went in there was
a partition dividing the front from the back. It was 7 or
8 feet high with a square opening. ''I wanted to increase
the size of the dance hall, so I moved the partition north
about 3 feet and built it higher up to the ceiling, with
swinging doors, making a complete separation of the
rooms," at a cost of $85.00. The swinging doors arc
stored in the basement. To suit its convenience, the defendant changed the transom. (Ab. 104).
Bernardi's Electric Company bill (Exhibit 34, Ab.
93, 105, 112) .. This bill was for $181.85. It is a question
whether any of it was for a permanent improvement, as
it was really a trade convenience. New wiring in conduit
was necessitated by defendant's installing an air compressor; electric lights were installed in ten booths with
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\Yire in conduit leading to each booth. There 'vere 7 chandeliers--4 in front and three in the back (Ab.105). Floor
said he could ren1ove lighting fixtures, worth $52.50. We
submit that the 10 branches and outlets for the booths
'\vould be a large part of the balance of the costs. The defendant failed to show what he had done with the old
lights.
It " . .as clearly the duty of the defendant to segregate the costs, "\vhich "\vere not permanent improvements.
\\T e submit that the other bills, except Elias Morris
& Sons Company, are not, in any sense for permanent
improvements.

As to Exhibit 35, bill of Spere Tent & Awning Company for two awnings (Ab. 94), Floor testified that they
are good for three or four years yet. (Ab. 105).
Exhibit 36, linoleum and carpet, $64.14. The linoleum was glued to the floor (Ab. 94). ''The linoleum is
pretty well worn now. I am going to put in another one
soon.'' The 9 ~ yards of stair carpet and pads for 15
steps, amounting to $17.90, is worn out. (Ab. 105, 106).
Exhibit 37, exterior painting done April 14, 1934,
$61.00 (Ab. 95, 106). The incidental items for approximately $80.00 (Exhibit 40), described on pages 95 and
96 of the abstract, for painting, paper, paper-hanging,
etc. are not allowable, because it was admitted that the
painting and papering with these materials was done in
1934, and has been covered over with new paint and
paper. (Ab. 106). Also screen doors, costing $23.49, are
included with $6.01 for lumber, but clearly these are not
permanent improvements (Ab. 106).
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Exhibit 38, cement on floor of gent's lavatory, which
was trade fixture (Ab. 95).
Objection was made that the foregoing testimony
was irrelevant and immaterial, and the cost of the
various items was not segregated and many of them were
not permanent improvements. We have assigned the ruling of the trial court as error in Assignment No. 21, Ab.
117.
It is impossible to ascertain how much was paid for
permanent improvements. The defendant 1ias failed
to furnish evidence on this, and Ball, having concealed
from his principals all the facts in regard to defendant's
lease, had no authority to pass upon and approve same.
As to the character of these improvements, and that
they were not permanent improvements within the provisions of the void lease, we refer to the case of Price v.
Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P. 767, and we quote from page
771 as follows :
''Generally speaking, the improvements,
especially the papering of the rooms, the inside
painting, much of the fencing, the chicken coops,
and the like, are not such as have a substantial or
permanent character, or as beneficial to the freehold; but they are such as are merely for the
ordinary convenience and comfort in the use and
occupation of the premises.''
(c) Let us assume that the positions were reversed
-that the original owners, with full knowledge, had
ratified the lease and the defendant refused to pay the
rent and he was sued for the rent. Could he not plead
that he was not liable; that there was no written agree-
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ment by hin1 to pay rent after the first three-year period;
that any alleged extension \Yas in parol and, therefore,
he would not be liable J?
The authorities are son1ewhat divided on this subject
but the following authorities hold that such plea would be
open to defendant:
JA~fES,

on Option Contracts, section 414:

"~ \Vhere

the option contract or offer falls
within a particular or special statute, the character and sufficiency of the election, or acceptance, required must be determined by reference to
the provisions of that statute.
Thus, the Alabama statute provides that a
contract for the sale of land, etc. is void unless
the purchase money, or a portion thereof, be paid
and the purchaser be put into possession of the
land by the seller. The owner of land gave a
\Yritten lease with option to the lessee to purchase. An election to purchase under the option
was made by the agent of the lessee whose authority to do so was not in writing as required by the.
statute, and it was held that since neither part
of the purchase money was paid, nor possession
taken under the option, the election, in law being
oral, was insufficient."

In speaking of an oral notice of extension, Judge
Cooley in the case of Veller v. Robinson, 15 N. W., 448
(Mich.) said :
"But the difficulty with this agreement is,
that it makes an extension for three years dependent for its creation and existence on a mere
oral understanding.''
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VI.
THE PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR
ATTORNEYS' FEES
The alleged lease provides, (Ab. 12), "and either
party agrees to pay all costs and attorney fees and expenses incurred by the other that sha~l arise from enforcing the covenants of this lease.''
The plaintiffs denied any liability for attorneys'
fees. (Ab. 99, 117). The court, in its finding No. 9 (Ab.
36) and in its judgment (Ab. 40, 41), allowed the defendant $500.00 as an attorney's fee. The plaintiffs have assigned as error such finding and judgment (Ab. 120, 121).
The plaintiffs submit that the court erred in such
finding and judgment, because:
(a) There is no privity between the plaintiffs and
the defendant and the provision for attorneys' fee was
not a covenant running with the land.
The alleged lease purports to be between ''The
Stockyards National Bank of South Omaha, the W. P.
Noble Company, both corporations, and the Fred Bragg
Estate, all by A. H. Ball, as Agent, as Lessors, and the
defendant, as lessee. (Ab. 12, 14). Of the lessors, only
one, to wit, theW. P. Noble Company, had any interest in
the property. The real owners conveyed the property to
the plaintiffs on the 31st day of May, 1939 and warranted immediate possession (Ab. 66, 67), and there was
no provision that the grantees (the plaintiffs) took the
property subject to the lease. The plaintiffs immediately, on June 2, 1939, notified the defendant to vacate
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the pre1nises (-A.b. 3, 4) and follo"'ed \Yith this suit for
unla,vful detainer. There is no contract bet,veen plaintiffs and defendant; they are strangers. The defendant
claims possession under an alleged contract which names
only one of the o"11ers of the property or of plaintiffs'
grantors. The provision for attorneys' fee in the alleged
contract is not a covenant running with the land, so as
to make the purchaser of the land liable on a contract,
though he is not a party to it. It in no wise touches or
concerns the land or its use. It is purely a personal covenant.
We quote from the case of Hollander v. Central
Metal, 23 L. R. A. (NS) 1135, 71 Atl. 442, the following:
"In Glen v. Canby, 24 Md. 127, the court stated as
the established doctrine, 'that a covenant to run with
the land must extend to the land, so that the thing required to be done will affect the quality, value or mode
of enjoying the estate conveyed, and thus constitute a
condition annexed or appurtenant to it; there must also
be a privity of estate between the contracting parties,
and the covenant must be consistent with the estate to
which it adheres, and of such a character that the estate
will not be defeated or changed by a performance of it.'
This is the doctrine asserted by Mr. Poe in 1 Poe Pl. &
Pr. 1st ed. 253, and reiterated by this court in Whalen
v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 108 Md. 11, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.)
130, 69 Atl. 390. In Taylor's Landlord and Tenant, 7th
ed. sec. 261, it is said that, 'in order that a covenant may
run with the land, its performance or non-performance
must affect the nature, quality, or value of the property
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demised, independent of collateral circumstances, or must
affect the mode of enjoyment. It must not only concern
the land, but there must also be a privity of estate between the contracting parties.'
'In order that a covenant may run with the landthat is, that its benefit or obligation may pass with the
ownership-it must respect the thing granted or demised,
and the act covenanted to be done or omitted must concern the land or estate conveyed. Whether a covenant
will or will not run with the land does not, however, so
much depend on whether it is to be performed on the
land itself, as on whether it tends directly or necessarily
to enhance its value or render it more beneficial and convenient to those by whom it is owned or occupied; for, if
this be the case, every successive assignee of the land will
be entitled to enforce the covenant.' 11 Cyc. 1080.
'Such covenants, and such only, run with land as
concern the land itself, in whosesoever hands it may be,
and become united with, and form a part of, the consideration for which the land, or some interest in it, is parted
with, between the covenantor and covenantee.' Washb.
Real Prop., sec. 1205. ''
We have cited many authorities laying down the
general rule. We have made search through the digests
and other sources and found no case where it has ever
been claimed that a provision for attorneys' fee runs
with the land.
We cite a few cases which come more nearly concerning the land than does attorneys' fee, and which the
courts hold do not run with the land:
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In the case of Cohen v. Buns, 170 N. Y. S., 560, one
Sidn1an \Y- eiss leased to B. Cohen for 10 years. Plaintiff
Cohen deposited "~ith \Yeiss $400 as security for the
performanc-e of the lease. Seven years later \\T eiss sold to
Buns, husband of defendant. He agreed to pay to plaintiff. He conYeyed property to his "\vife as a gift. Plaintiff demanded the deposit fron1 "vife.
Held: The covenant in the lease to repay the deposit
was a personal covenant upon the part of the then owner
of the premises and did not run with the land. There was
no privity of covenant or contract between plaintiff and
defendant and no evidence of any promise on the part of
the defendant to pay it, nor is there any evidence that she
assumed the obligation when she accepted the deed of the
premises. Under such circumstances the judgment cannot be sustained. Knulsen v. Craque, 99 N.Y.S. 911.
In the case of Magoon v. Eastman, 84 Atl. 869, a
lease of a farm required the lessee to leave as much hay
as there was on the farm when he took possession. He
left the required amount but some of it was not cut in
proper season and was therefor of less value than it
otherwise would have been.
Held, that the lessee's obligation concerning the hay
was not a covenant running with the land, but was a
mere personal obligation and, hence, an action of covenant could not be maintained by the lessor's assignee
for breach thereof.
"It is claimed that the plaintiff, as successor
in interest to the lessor, was entitled- to the required amount of hay properly and seasonably
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harvested, according to the rule of good husbandry. This may be so, but the question here is
whether he can recover the damage in an action of
covenant brought in his own name. We think the
defendant's obligation concerning the hay is not
one that touches or concerns the land. The agreement to return was a personal obligation."
''If a covenant in a lease will be for the benefit either of the landlord or tenant by reason of
its relation to the land, it concerns the land so as
to run with it."
Bailey v. Walker & Co. 290 F. 282

''A covenant in a lease giving the lessee an
option to lease other lands from the lessor is
purely collateral and could not run with the land,
even against heirs, when named in the instrument,
since the necessary privity is absent.''
Watts v. Bowen, 139 N. E. 658

"A provision in a lease limiting liability of
lessor for damages sustained by tenant to one
month's rent does not run with the land and the
original lessor's grantor cannot enforce it."
Strong v. Woodard I. Co., 158 N.Y.S.
513

"A covenant of the lessor to buy, at the termination of the lease, the buildings remaining on
the premises is personal to the lessor and does not
run with the land, nor bind her heirs or legatees."
In re: Kenshaw, 75 N. Y. S. 1047
Etowah M. Co. v. Willis Valley, etc.
25 So. 720
(b) The attorneys' services rendered in this case
is not within the terms of the contract.
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The defendant, in order to justify his possession,
claimed under the alleged lease. The plaintiffs denied
there 'Yas any lease. This made the issue; that is, was
there a lease~ The services of the defendant's attorneys
was rendered in attempting to establish that the defendant held a valid lease. The lower court found the defendant has a valid lease. Defendant did not attempt to sustain any covenant of the lease, but only, was there a
lease. As to the pro:vision for the extension, the defendant attempted to prove only that it had complied with a
condition of the lease entitling it to the extension. The
defendant did not agree to expend $1,000.00 in improvements. The lease says, ''For and in consideration of the
expenditure by the lessee in permanent improvements in
and on said store and basement to the extent of $1,000.00,
* * * * an option, under the same terms as herein set
forth, for an additional 5 years is hereby granted * * * *
said option to be exercised on or before 30 days prior to
the expiration of 3 years * * * * In case said option is
exercised, the rent shall be $90.00 per month.''
It is to be noted that the defendant in no wise agreed
to make any improvements. So the provision for an
extension was conditional, (1) on the improvements
having been made; (2) in the election of the defendant.
The defendant attempted to establish, and the lower
court held it did, that it performed both conditions. This
was in line with the whole issue-did the defendant hold
a lease~ If its lease was valid, then there was no question as to its covenants.
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This case comes within the principle enunciated by
this court in:
Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah, 137, 292
P. 206 (10)
Leone, et al, v. Zuniga, 34 P. (2d)
699 (3) 84 Utah 417
Brandley v. Lewis, 92 P. ( 2d) 338
VII.
THE ·FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND JUDGMENT ARE ERRONEOUS
The plaintiffs have assigned error to each finding of
fact, except finding No. 4. (Assignments Nos. 29 to 36,
A b. 118, 120).
As to Finding No. 1, Assignment of Error No. 29,
(Ab. 118), states fully our objection.
Findings Nos. 2 and 3 seem to be based on insufficiency of allegations in the complaint. The defendant
entered the premises under a void lease. We quote the
syllabus from Utah Loan & Trust Co. v. Garbutt, 6 Utah
142, 23 P. 758:
"Under 2 Comp. Laws Utah 1888, sec. 3916,
requiring a lease for more than one year to be in
writing, and, if made by an agent, requiring the
agent's authority in writing, one of six executors
having no written authority from any of the
others, cannot make a lease for more than one
year,.a majority being required for any valid act
by section 4030.
The acceptance of rent under a lease void
under the statutes of frauds creates only a tenancy from month to month, the rent being payable
monthly.''
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The rule is universal that when a person occupies
premises under a lease void under the statute of frauds,
in collecting the rent for the occupation the terms of the
lease "'ill control. 35 C. J. 1028, 1124, sec. 344.
Finding No. 3. As to this the assignment of error
No. 32, (Ab. 118), sets forth fully the objections except
Cluff was employed by Ball as attorney and the employment "~as not ratified by the predecessors.
Finding No. 6, (Assignment of Error No. 33, Ab.
118), points out this finding is contrary to the evidence
in finding that ~layme Noble visited the premises several
times while the improvements were being made. Floor
testified : ''These changes had been made and the tile
work done when Miss Noble came down." (Ab. 97,110).
\\T e have discussed the other matters elsewhere in
this brief, except the finding that the plaintiffs had
knowledge of the lease. This is immaterial. The warranty deed they received warranting immediate possession was a repudiation of any claim by any person for
any lease on, or for any part of, the Eagle Block extending beyond May 31, 1939, the day the premises were conveyed to them, and they being privy to the grantors have
the right to plead the statute of frauds.
Collins v. Lacky, 123 P. 1118, 40 L.
R. A. (N.S.) 885 and annotation;
Givens v. Mason, 266 S. W. 7;
Hansen v. Buttison, 27 N. W. 423;
Bank v. Bank, 114 N. W. 409.
As to finding No. 7, and assignment of .error No.
34, we amend the assignment by making it as follows:
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'' 34. The court erred in making Finding No. 7, because the evidence shows that no notice of the exercise
of the option was given to A. H. Ball, and A. H. Ball,
having given the lease without authority, notice to him
would not be notice to his principals, and there was no
written notice of the acceptance of the extension signed
by the defendant."
We have argued these points elsewhere.
As to finding No. 8 and assignment of error No. 35,
we amend the assignment of error to read as follows:
'' 35. The court erred in making Finding No. 8,
beeause the matter of good faith upon the part of the defendant was not an issue in the case, and further, the
defendant knew, or should have known, that his lease had
no written authorization from the owners.''
Finding No. 9 grants the attorneys' fee, and assignment of error No. 36 (Ab. 120), we amend to read as
follows:
'' 36. The court erred in making Finding No. 9, because the matter of attorneys' fee was not an issue, as
the plaintiffs did not agree to pay any attorneys' fee,
and this suit does not come within the terms of the contract entitling the defendant to attorneys' fee.''
We discuss this question elsewhere.
The lower court, having adopted the wrong theory
of both the facts and the law, and the findings being erroneous, it necessarily follovvs that the conclusions of law
and judgment are erroneous. The plaintiffs' assignments
Nos. 37 to 42, (Ab. 120) are to the erroneous conclusions
and judgment.
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In conclusion, the alleged lease was void under the
statute of frauds, and because it \vas not executed in the
names of all of the owners; and the permanent improvements were not sufficient to meet the conditions of the
alleged lease, and the defendant did not bind himself for
the extension period, and the plain tiffs are not liable for
any attorneys' fee.
Respectfully submitted,

ALLEN T. SANFORD,
E. A. ROGERS,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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